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I. INTRODUCTION
"Value is a word of many meanings," noted Justice Brandeis
in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission.1 The concept of value, which includes market
value, value to owner, utility cost, fair price, intrinsic value or jus-
tified price, and normal value,2 is critical to all parties in interest
* B.A. Ohio State University; J.D., magna cum laude, University of Houston. Kaaran E.
Thomas is a partner in the general-litigation section of Vinson & Elkins, Houston, Texas.
Ms. Thomas specializes in creditors' rights and bankruptcy law. Ms. Thomas is also an ad-
junct professor of law at the University of Texas, Austin, Texas, and co-chairperson of the
Conference on Valuation of Assets in Bankruptcy sponsored by the University of Texas
.School of Law.
1. 262 U.S. 276, 310 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY, ch. II (1937).
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in a bankruptcy proceeding. The value of property of the estate'
provides adequate protection for holders of secured claims," funds
for payment of administrative claims,5 distribution to holders of
unsecured claims,6 and it also provides the hope of reorganization
for debtors.7 Therefore, knowing which concept of value a court
will apply at a given stage in a bankruptcy proceeding is impera-
tive. Property, which is an asset and, thus, of great value to the
debtor/owner, may have a market value far less than the debt
owed against it. Conversely, the original cost of the property may
vastly exceed its current market value. Finally, property that is
worthless in the secured creditor's hands may have immense utility
value in the hands of the debtor/owner.
The Bankruptcy Code requires a case-by-case valuation of
property at several points during a bankruptcy proceeding.8 For
example, the same property may be found to have the following
values: 1) a fair-market value for purposes of determining the
debtor's pre-filing solvency;" 2) a value incidental to determining
"adequate protection"; 10 3) a secured-claim valuation;11 4) an "in-
dubitable equivalence" value for plan confirmation; 2 and 5) a liq-
uidation value for plan confirmation.'3 Clearly, a court does not
determine all of these "values" on the same basis or under the
same value definition.14 Instead, a court applies different value
standards in each of the above situations, and prior determinations
are unlikely to constitute res judicata in subsequent
determinations.' 5
3. Property of the estate is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
4. The term "secured claim" is not defined in the Code. The Code describes the treat-
ment of "[an allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate
has an interest." 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988). The term "lien" is defined in the Code as a
"charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an
obligation." 11 U.S.C. § 101(33) (1988). The term "adequate protection" is not defined. 11
U.S.C. § 363 (1988). For a discussion of adequate protection see infra Part III of this paper.
5. The holders of claims for reasonable and necessary costs of administration are enti-
tled to reimbursement according to 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1988).
6. Unsecured claims are those arising before the debtor commences a bankruptcy case,
which are not secured by a lien as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(33) (1988). See also 11 U.S.C. §
506 (1988).
7. See infra Part VIII.
8. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 339, 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6295, 6312.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 101(29) (1988).
10. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361 to -363 (1988).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (1988).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 16-17.
15. See infra Part VII.
2
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One reason for the disparate results of different valuation
hearings is that various statutory provisions require a court to
value property at different times. For example, property that was
valuable before the bankruptcy filing-the time at which value was
determined for proving solvency under the preference stat-
ute1 6-either may have lost much of that value by the time of the
adequate-protection hearing or may have increased in value.
17
More important, a court may apply a different value test under
each separate section of the Code.
The Code directs a court to determine pre-petition solvency
for preference purposes by using the fair-valuation standard. For
example, a statutory provision mandating this standard"8 states
that an entity is "insolvent" when the entity's "financial condition
[is] such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of
such entity's property, at a fair valuation." 9
Appraisers and courts generally define the term "at a fair val-
uation" to mean the value that could be made available for pay-
ment of debts within a reasonable period of time, assuming a will-
ing buyer and a willing seller exist.20 However, the adequate-
16. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988). The Code requires, as a precondition, that the debtor be
insolvent at the time of the transfer that is sought to be avoided. Accordingly, equity in the
property may serve to disprove the insolvency requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3) (1988).
Thus, a court's determination of value may deprive the estate of the property in question or,
in the alternative, deprive a secured creditor of its right to foreclose upon the property at
any of the stages in a bankruptcy proceeding. For example, in preference proceedings, if the
value the court ascribes to the debtor's property deems the debtor insolvent prior to the
debtor's petition (and more importantly prior to the granting of the lien), a trustee or a
debtor-in-possession may avoid the lien under the preference provisions of the Code. 11
U.S.C. § 547 (1988). If a secured creditor retains its lien, however, an estate then must pro-
vide adequate protection if it intends to use, sell, or lease the collateral of the secured credi-
tor. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1988). If the debtor is unable to provide adequate protection, the se-
cured creditor can petition the court to lift the automatic stay and to foreclose on the
collateral. Occurring under section 362, this process allows the secured creditor to repossess
and to dispose of the collateral in satisfaction of the debt. Moreover, the equity cushion,
which protects a secured creditor's lien from avoidance under the preference statutes, will
not necessarily protect an estate from modification of the automatic stay.
17. See, e.g., In re Wells, 52 Bankr. 368 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985). In Wells, the debtor
commenced a valuation hearing under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982) to determine the value of
her homestead. At the hearing, the debtor's expert appraised the homestead at $7,500 as of
May 25, 1985, while the creditor's expert valued the homestead at $8,900 as of July 26, 1985.
Id. at 368. The bankruptcy court found that the debtor had made substantial repairs be-
tween May 25 (the date of filing of the petition) and July 26 (the date of the creditor's
evaluation) and that "[fjor the purpose of lien avoidance under § 506 the size of the debt
and value of the property are determined as of the date of the filing of the petition." Id. at
369 (citing Brager v. Blum, 39 Bankr. 441 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984)).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (1988).
19. Id.
20. First Nat'l Bank v. Perdue Hous. Indus., Inc., 437 F. Supp. 36 (W.D. Okla. 1977);
In re O'Neill Enters., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 940 (W.D. Va. 1973).
3
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protection provision 1 of the Code imposes no such value defini-
tion. Indeed, the Code imposes no valuation standard for deter-
mining any post-petition value issues. The drafters of the Code left
these valuation standards undefined, intending that courts would
apply the valuation concepts "in light of [the] facts of each case
and general equitable principles."22 Unfortunately, courts have
construed this flexibility as providing them with carte blanche to
avoid imposing any legal standards on valuation. These lack-of-
value standards cause difficulty for practitioners and judges alike.
Therefore, this article will explore the emerging issues and ambigu-
ities that have evolved from court attempts to deal with valuation
issues.
II. EMERGING AMBIGUITIES: PRESENT VALUE, RISKS, AND THE
DILEMMA OF "INDUBITABLE EQUIVALENCE"
Courts do not review valuation evidence in a vacuum. There-
fore, they must design legal standards or tests against which the
valuation evidence may be measured. To date, the "legal stan-
dards," which have emerged from bankruptcy and appellate courts,
are ambiguous, at best. Courts have difficulty defining and balanc-
ing valuation issues. The most significant of these issues are: 1)
whether a court should value a secured creditor's interest in collat-
eral as something apart from the value of the collateral itself in
arriving at a "value" for adequate protection or plan-confirmation
purposes; 2) whether a court may take into account risks to which
a secured creditor's collateral may be subjected, because of delays
in recouping on its investment in the collateral, or other problems
when fashioning "indubitable equivalence," under section 361(3) or
at confirmation; and 3) whether delays in payment, which cause
decreases in the present value of collateral, that is, a cognizable
decrease, constitute either a "taking" under the fifth amendment
or trigger the need for adequate-protection payments under the
Bankruptcy Code.
Bankruptcy courts have delegated the task of resolving the
ambiguities related to valuation issues to trial lawyers and bank-
ruptcy judges. In order to accomplish their mission, these lawyers
and judges must develop some familiarity with the evolution of
valuation issues beginning with two oft-quoted pre-Code cases.
In the first of these cases, Wright v. Union Central Life Insur-
21. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1988).
22. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 339 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6295.
4
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ance Co., 23 a debtor/farmer filed bankruptcy under a now-super-
seded provision of the Bankruptcy Act and attempted to exercise
his right of redemption with respect to a tract of land. The "nar-
row issue" was whether a court must give a debtor an opportunity
"to redeem the property at the reappraised value" or "at a value
fixed by the court" before the court can order a public sale of the
property.24
The Court held that authorizing the debtor to redeem the
property would not result in the debtor receiving the property at
less than its actual value.2 5 In assessing the rights of the secured
creditor in a forced sale, the Court noted that the Bankruptcy Act
provided "[s]afeguards .. .to protect the rights of secured credi-
tors, throughout the proceedings, to the extent of the value of the
property."26 The Court added, however, that a creditor has "no
constitutional claim . . .to more than that. 2 7
The Court in Wright failed to comment on the second pre-
Code case that is most often quoted on contemporary valuation
issues-Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Murel Holding Corp,2
a Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision. Such failure to com-
ment, however, may be explained because of the different issues
presented to the respective courts and did not imply the Court was
overruling Murel.29
23. 311 U.S. 273 (1940).
24. Id. at 276. Union Central Life Insurance Company (Union Central), the lienholder
on the tract of land, filed a petition with the bankruptcy court praying that the bankruptcy
proceeding be dismissed or, in the alternative, that the property be immediately sold. Id.
Union Central alleged:
that the debtor's financial condition was beyond all reasonable hope of rehabilita-
tion, that he had failed to comply with the order of the court requiring two-fifths
of the crops to be delivered to the trustee, that he had made no offer of composi-
tion, and that he had failed to pay taxes and insurance and had made no payment
on principal since 1925 and none on interest since 1930.
Id.
The Court found error in the denial of an opportunity to redeem the land at the value
fixed by the bankruptcy court before ordering a public sale. The Court reasoned that the
Bankruptcy Act must be "liberally construed to give the debtor the full measure of the relief
afforded by Congress ... lest its benefits be frittered away by narrow formalistic interpreta-
tions which disregard the spirit and the letter of the Act." Id. at 279. The Court also stated
that the "debtor and creditor alike" could be afforded equal protection "only by holding
that the debtor's request for redemption [could not] be defeated by a request of a secured
creditor for a public sale." Id.
25. Id. at 277-78.
26. Id. at 278.
27. Id.
28. 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
29. To illustrate such differences, Murel involved an appeal of an order allowing a
foreclosure. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Metropolitan) held a mortgage upon an
apartment house in the amount of $400,500. Id. The two corporate owners of the apartment
5
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Murel involved an appeal from an order allowing foreclosure
on an apartment house.30 The Murel court declined to continue
the stay against foreclosure.31 In making its determination, the
court reviewed the debtor's proposed "plan" to determine whether
the plan offered "adequate protection" to Metropolitan's interest,
the first lienholder5 2 The Murel court noted that the grant of eq-
uitable power to a bankruptcy judge to award "adequate protec-
tion" was a grant of "constitutional" significance."3 In other words,
the Murel court implied that if an undersecured creditor does not
receive adequate protection, then the loss the creditor incurs may
constitute a "taking" under the fifth amendment, because, as the
court stated, "payment ten years" from now "is not generally the
equivalent of payment now."34 Thus, the court exhorted:
[W]e are to remember not only the underlying purposes of the
[adequate-protection] section, but the constitutional limitation
to which it must conform. It is plain that "adequate protection"
must be completely compensatory; and that payment ten years
hence is not generally the equivalent of payment now. Interest is
indeed the common measure of the difference, but a creditor who
fears the safety of his [or her] principal will scarcely be content
with that; [the creditor] wishes to get his [or her] money or at
least the property. We see no reason to suppose that the statute
was intended to deprive [the creditor] of that in the interest of
junior holders, unless by a substitute of the most indubitable
equivalence5
The Murel court held that to compel a mortgagee "to forego all
house were Murel Holding Corporation (Murel) and Abmar Holding Corporation (Abmar),
petitioners in bankruptcy. Id. Metropolitan had "filed a bill of foreclosure in the Supreme
Court of New York on December 8th, 1934," and obtained appointment of a receiver for the
rents. Id. Both Murel and Abmar immediately filed petitions to obtain an ex parte stay of
the foreclosure. Id. "When the bill [of foreclosure] was filed the defaults on the mortgage
amounted to nearly $100,000; about $20,000 of taxes and assessments, $43,000 of interest
and $36,000 of amortization payments." Id. at 942. Assessed at $540,000, the properties were
accruing rentals at the rate of $3,600 a month. Id. The debtors proposed a "'plan of reor-
ganization,'" which provided that "the second mortgagee was to provide $11,000, to be used
by the debtors to alter [certain] apartments in the building." Id. This proposed advance by
the second lienholder was to have "priority over all liens but the" tax arrearages. Id. The
debtors assumed they could lease these apartments readily and could accrue about $59,346
in rentals with expenses of only $20,400 per year, "leaving a yearly surplus of $38,946." Id.
The debtor's plan proposed a ten-year stretch out-a familiar concept to bankruptcy practi-
tioners in the 1980s-which Metropolitan, the first mortgage holder, declined to accept. Id.
30. Id. at 941-42.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 942.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
6
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amortization payments for ten years and take its chances as to the
fate of its lien at the end of that period, though it is now secured
by a margin of only ten per cent" was not "adequate protection.
'36
The Wright and Murel cases are the cases most frequently
cited by appellate courts in determining and valuing interests of
secured creditors under the Bankruptcy Code. Furthermore, the
two cases continue to have significant contemporary influence in
defining "adequate protection," "indubitable equivalence" and
what "interest" may be protected from a decrease in value in
bankruptcy cases even though the cases differ analytically and fac-
tually." An example of such difference is that in Wright a secured
creditor requested a denial of a debtor's rights to redeem prop-
erty.3a The creditor was not being asked to countenance any signif-
icant delay in the exercise of its rights.3 9 Murel, on the other hand,
concerned a "stretch out," a classic, long-term, low-interest rate
"balloon payment" restructure of the lender's original note of a
type familiar to contemporary practitioners.4
The enactment of the Code4 ' with its express statutory auto-
matic-stay and adequate-protection provisions, including the "in-
dubitable equivalence" provision taken from Murel,42 gave rise to a
series of appellate decisions construing Murel and Wright. The
first of note, Crocker National Bank v. American Mariner Indus-
tries, Inc.,43 addressed "whether an undersecured creditor who is
stayed by a bankruptcy petition from repossessing its collateral is
entitled, under the concept of 'adequate protection,' . . . to com-
pensation for the delay in enforcing its rights against the
collateral.'"4
36. Id. at 942-43.
37. See supra notes 23 and 28.
38. Wright, 311 U.S. 273 (1940).
39. Id.
40. Murel, 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935). Indeed, the facts of Murel are not dissimilar
from the facts of United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd., 793 F.2d
1380 (5th Cir. 1986). See infra note 63.
41. Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549-2688 (currently codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to -1330
(1988)).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (1988).
43. 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter American Mariner]. Timbers I resulted
from a dispute between United Savings Association of Texas, (United) the lender, and Tim-
bers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., a limited partnership, whose sole asset was an apart-
ment project pledged to United to secure its debt. The monthly cash flow from the apart-
ment project was "tens of thousands of dollars less than the monthly debt service payments
[to United]." In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 808 F.2d 363, 375 n.1 (5th Cir. 1987)
(en banc) affd. 484 U.S. 365 (1988). The debtor's counsel conceded in oral argument before
the Fifth Circuit that the likelihood of the debtor's ability to reorganize was virtually nonex-
istent. Id.
44. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 427. The collateral was worth $110,000. The se-
[Vol. 51
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In ruling "adequate protection" authorized such compensa-
tion, the American Mariner court decided the following:
1) that the interest protected pursuant to section 361 includes
a secured creditor's right "to take possession of and sell [its] collat-
eral" and "the creditor's equitable right to reinvest the proceeds of
the sale"; 5
2) that the term "indubitable equivalent" as used in section
361 is derived from Murel and contemplates adequate protection
under section 361 of the present value of the secured creditor's
interest;
46
3) that the secured creditor "is entitled to compensation for
the delay in enforcing its rights during the interim between [the
filing of] the petition and confirmation of [a] plan" of
reorganization. 7
Relying heavily on Murel, the American Mariner court was
especially persuaded by Judge Learned Hand's interpretation of
adequate protection, which emphasized two factors: 1) that ade-
quate protection, "to be 'completely compensatory'. . . must com-
pensate for present value," that is, "payment ten years hence is
not generally the equivalent of payment now,' '48 and 2) that "ade-
quate protection must insure the safety of the principal."' 9
Eighteen months after American Mariner, in In re Briggs
Transportation Co.,5" the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals deter-
mined that adequate protection did not entitle "undersecured
creditors as a matter of law to interest payments from a debtor to
compensate the creditors for lost opportunity costs due to the de-
lay in reinvesting the collateral's liquidated value caused by [the]
automatic stay. '51 Finding that such payments were "permissible
but not required to provide adequate protection," the Briggs court
remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for further findings.2
The Briggs court determined that adequate protection safe-
guarded "the rights of secured creditors, throughout the proceed-
ings, to the extent of the value of their property," and that a se-
cured creditor had "no constitutional claim . . . to more than
cured creditor's debt, including accrued interest, was approximately $370,000. Id.
45. Id. at 431.
46. Id. at 432-33.
47. Id. at 435.
48. Id. at 433.
49. Id.
50. 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985).
51. Id. at 1340.
52. Id.
8
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that."53 The court reviewed the legislative history of the adequate-
protection provisions of the Code and concluded that the "statu-
tory scheme indicates that adequate protection is intended to en-
compass a broad range of creditor interests and does not mandate
an interpretation of the creditors' interests as the whole of the eco-
nomic bargain.
54
The Briggs court also examined various ways of providing ade-
quate protection for the creditor's interests and concluded that
payment of "economic depreciation" was appropriate.5 5 Disagree-
ing with the creditor's interpretation of "indubitable equivalence"
as used in Murel, the court distinguished Murel, pointing out it
had "dealt with confirmation of a plan opposed by creditors, rather
than the temporary interim protection of an automatic stay." 56
The court's interpretation of Murel is not entirely accurate, be-
cause Murel, in fact, involved an appeal from an order denying a
motion to vacate a stay of the prosecution of a foreclosure
suit-not an appeal from an order confirming a plan of
reorganization. 57
Based on this interpretation of Murel, the Briggs court de-
clined to find Murel precedent for construing the term "indubita-
ble equivalence," as used in section 361(3), as mandating payment
of lost opportunity costs to the creditors. Instead, Briggs espoused
a broad, flexible approach, concluding that the creditors had "no
right to be placed in the same economic position as if there had
been no bankruptcy filing."58 After reviewing the legislative history
of the Code, the Briggs court decided to balance the interests of
debtors and creditors on a "case-by-case basis. ' 59 Therefore, the
court declined to fashion a rule mandating strict requirements for
adequate protection. The court did provide certain guidelines for
what might constitute adequate protection in a given case, how-
ever, suggesting that the question might turn on the following is-
sues: 1) whether the creditor had been "greatly oversecured"; 2)
the "quality of the collateral"; 3) "the length of the stay"; 4) the
parties' "reasonable expectations" upon entering into their bar-
gain; 5) "whether the collateral's lien value is demonstrated to be
appreciating, depreciating or remaining relatively stable"; 6)
53. Id. at 1342.
54. Id. at 1345.
55. Id. at 1345-46.
56. Id. at 1346.
57. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
58. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1346-47.
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"whether taxes and other payments designed to keep the collateral
free of statutory liens are being paid or will be paid"; and 7)
whether in cases in which the chance of reorganization is slight,
"liquidation values, including lost opportunity costs, might be
deemed protectable."' Finally, the Briggs court emphasized that
its "shopping list" of adequate protection was "not exclusive, but
merely indicative of the particular risk and reliance factors shown
in the nature and history of the credit transaction which a court
may take into account in making adequate protection
determinations.
6 2
In July 1986, in In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates,
Ltd. (Timbers /),63 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
bankruptcy court and held that undersecured creditors may not
receive periodic "interest" payments during a bankruptcy proceed-
ing, as compensation for lost opportunity costs,"' thereby declining
to follow American Mariner.6 5 In arriving at its decision, the Fifth
Circuit attempted to determine
whether Congress in 1978, in codifying the principles which had
developed under the common law to ensure that a secured credi-
tor's interest in the value of its collateral would be adequately
protected during the pendency of a reorganization proceeding, in-
tended that an undersecured creditor would be entitled to receive
during the proceeding periodic cash interest payments on the
value of the collateral, even though a claim for interest on the
debt would not be allowed at the conclusion of the proceeding."
Seeking relief from the automatic stay of section 362, United,
the secured creditor, alleged that it did not have adequate protec-
tion for its "interest" in the collateral. 7 United argued that the
debtor's promise to pay United's loan in the future was of less
value than present payment and that the perceptible decrease rep-
resented United's "interest" in its collateral for which United was
entitled to compensation-an argument with significant legal pre-
cedent."8 United argued and the district court held that the con-
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1349-50.
63. 793 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1986).
64. Id. at 1382.
65. 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984). For a more complete discussion of American Mari-
ner, see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
66. Timbers I, 793 F.2d at 1381.
67. Id. at 1383.
68. Id. Indeed, United's position was based upon Judge Learned Hand's opinion in
Murel, in which he stated: "'[A]dequate protection' must be completely compensatory, and
... payment ten years hence is not generally the equivalent of payment now." Murel, 75
F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935). The justices who heard oral argument in another bankruptcy
10
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cept of "adequate protection" required the estate to compensate
United for the decrease in value caused by the delay. 9 The bank-
ruptcy court agreed with United and assessed a "charge," which
was roughly equivalent to the interest accruing on United's loan,
incident to this delay. 0
In 1987, the Fifth Circuit, in an en banc opinion, affirmed
Timbers I in United Savings Association of Texas v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd. (Timbers II).71 In Timbers II, the
court held that the adequate-protection provisions of the Code do
not require the estate to reimburse an undersecured creditor for
the losses it suffered because of lost interest payments or, in other
words, lost opportunity costs, as a result of "the delay of the Chap-
ter 11 reorganization proceeding during the pendency of the auto-
matic stay. '72 United contended that this "interpretation of the
adequate protection provisions" effectively "preclud[ed] an under-
secured creditor" "from ever obtaining relief from the automatic
stay." 3
valuation case, Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988),
echoed that same position. In this connection, the following questions from the justices
before whom Ahlers was argued are instructive.
QUESTION: Suppose [Mr. Ahlers] promised to give money? What is the dif-
ference between promising to give his labor and promising to give money in the
future?
MR. NEEDLER: If Mr. Ahlers confirmed a plan on a promise, Justice Scalia,
and one month into the plan he did not deliver on the promise, then Mr. Conn
would run into court under § 1112(B) and the case is dismissed.
QUESTION: So it works for money too?
MR. NEEDLER: It works for anything.
QUESTION: So it's not just sweat equity, it is even non-sweat equity?
You say that if the debtor comes in, the debtor who has already defaulted on
one promise to pay money, if he comes in and says I promise to pay more money
in the future, the court has to allow a reorganization on the basis of that new
promise?
QUESTION: Okay. So you are not just arguing sweat equity, you are arguing
that you don't have to put up money. It is enough that you promised to put up
money. And if and when you don't make good on that promise, then we'll undo
the reorganization, but meanwhile we let it go.
Transcript of Proceedings at 26-27, Ahlers, (No. 86-958).
The Ahlers Court, after asking the foregoing questions of Mr. Ahlers' attorney, ruled
unanimously that a promise to pay money was not "value" that Mr. Ahlers, a farmer, could
use as consideration for retaining his interest in his farm. Id.
Interestingly, the questions the Court posed in Ahlers are similar to those posed in
Timbers III-that money given in consideration at the time of reorganization does not have
the same value today that it will have at a later date.
69. Timbers I, 793 F.2d at 1383-84.
70. Id.
71. 808 F.2d 363 (1987).
72. Id. at 364.
73. Id. at 370. 11
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In response, the Timbers II court pointed to section 362(d)(2),
"which entitles a secured creditor to obtain relief from [an] auto-
matic stay" when "the debtor does not have an equity" in the col-
lateral and the collateral "is not necessary to an effective reorgani-
zation."74 Bankruptcy courts-in determining whether collateral is
necessary for an effective reorganization under section
362(d)(2)-apply the "'reasonable possibility of successful reor-
ganization' standard."75 This standard allows "somewhat more in-
dulgence" under these circumstances than if the issue had been
raised during a "full-blown hearing that attends a motion to dis-
miss or convert the case brought under [section] 1112. ' '7" The Tim-
bers II court, however, exhorted bankruptcy judges to give "mean-
ing" to the "effective reorganization" standard 71 in automatic-stay
hearings. As is apparent from the two holdings, the Timbers H and
American Mariner courts differed enormously in their interpreta-
tions of how a debtor should make cash payments to undersecured
creditors pursuant to section 361.78 The major differences between
the two circuits' analyses focused on the following: 1) the definition
of the secured creditor's interest to be protected under section 361,
and 2) the definition of the term "indubitable equivalence."
First, the Timbers I court espoused a limited definition of the
secured creditor's interest to be protected-the value of the collat-
eral securing the creditor's claim.7 9 The court construed any other
payments sought by a creditor during the pendency of a case with
respect to collateral that was not decreasing in value to be "inter-
est" payments, which the Code expressly prohibits unless a credi-
tor is oversecured.
80
Second, the Timbers I court, after examining Murel and the
legislative history behind the indubitable-equivalence section of
the Code,"' concluded that the term indubitable equivalence-as
used in Murel and in the Code-"refers to a substitute for a par-
ticular interest; it does not define the interest." 2 Interestingly,
both the Timbers 183 and Briggs84 courts argued that Murel dealt
with confirmation of a plan of reorganization and, thus, was irrele-
74. Id.
75. Id. at 371.
76. Id.
77. id.
78. See American Mariner, supra note 43.
79. Timbers I, 793 F.2d at 1389.
80. Id. at 1385-87.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (1988).
82. Timbers I, 793 F.2d at 1389.
83. Id.
84. In re Brigg Transportation Co., 780 F.2d 1339, 1346 (8th Cir. 1985).
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vant to issues of adequate protection.
According to Timbers I, the American Mariner court errone-
ously construed section 361(3) as effectively granting a creditor the
same rights the creditor would have if the creditor were permitted
to foreclose and liquidate its collateral and then reinvest the pro-
ceeds to obtain present value. Murel failed to mandate any protec-
tion against a decline in value of the creditor's collateral, 85 accord-
ing to the Timbers I court. The court urged that Murel addressed
post-plan interest payments to secured creditors. Therefore, ac-
cording to Timbers I, construing an indubitable-equivalence stan-
dard as mandating pre-confirmation interest payments would
change settled law. Finding no such intent in the legislative history
of the Code, 86 the Timbers I court, instead, stated that the protec-
tions of the fifth amendment ensure an undersecured creditor
"only that the value of the secured position of a creditor be main-
tained during the stay.
87
Timbers I extracted four "factors" from the common law that
govern the exercise of courts' equitable powers to grant or to lift a
stay: 1) whether continuing the stay "would result in an undue risk
of material harm to the secured creditor"; 2) whether a "reasona-
ble possibility of reorganization or rehabilitation" existed; 3)
whether the debtor needed the property in question or whether the
property was required for rehabilitation; and 4) whether the prop-
erty had equity from which a debtor or creditor might realize a
benefit.88 The Timbers I court stated that it was "properly reluc-
tant to place significant weight on the unexplained [congressional]
action" of including the "'indubitable equivalent language' [in sec-
tion 361(3)], particularly when the mute change would alter settled
law." 89
In the 1988 case of United Savings Association of Texas v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd. (Timbers III),90 the Su-
preme Court overruled American Mariner by holding that an un-
dersecured creditor is "not entitled to interest on its collateral dur-
ing the [duration of the automatic] stay." Just as in Timbers I and
Timbers II, the Supreme Court in Timbers III failed to address
the issue of how to balance any detriment attributable to a de-
crease in the time-value of the secured creditor's collateral when
85. Id. at 1389, 1401.
86. Id. at 1399-1401.
87. Id. at 1390 (citing Wright, supra note 23).
88. Id. at 1391.
89. Id. at 1400.
90. 484 U.S. 365, 382 (1988).
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the loan is undersecured, against the potential "benefit" that a se-
cured creditor may realize from a successful reorganization. The
Timbers II court noted only that a successful reorganization bene-
fits a secured creditor, because the "secured claim is valued on a
going-concern basis ... , and the secured creditor is not com-
pelled to liquidate its collateral at forced-sale prices."'" However,
none of the Timbers decisions provides any justification for deny-
ing the secured creditor the right to make the choice between im-
mediate liquidation of its collateral and potential greater recovery
through a reorganization. The Bankruptcy Code does not contem-
plate inserting such judicial determinations of a creditor's "best in-
terest" into an adequate-protection hearing. Moreover, all three
Timbers holdings appear to overlook significant valuation issues
concerning the discount rates, or decreases, that should be applied
to determine the present-value of collateral that the bankruptcy
estate is using. The Timbers decisions deny to undersecured credi-
tors the right to receive "periodic cash interest payments on the
value of the collateral. ' 92 Ironically, the Timbers decisions also
state that the protections of the fifth amendment ensure an under-
secured creditor "that the value of the secured position .. .be
maintained during the stay."93
If interest is indeed the common measure of the difference be-
tween payment now and payment ten years (or ten weeks) hence,
as Judge Hand noted,94 the various Timbers holdings pose a di-
lemma: How can the present value of an undersecured creditor's
collateral be maintained as required by the fifth amendment with-
out periodic cash payments on the value of the collateral? By not
allowing some compensation for decrease in present value as a part
of "adequate protection," it would seem that the Timbers holdings
are on a collision course with the "taking" clause of the fifth
amendment of the constitution.
The Supreme Court in Timbers III denied undersecured cred-
itors the right to interest on their claims, relying on the language
of section 506 of the Code to the effect that only oversecured credi-
tors are entitled to such interest. 5 This holding appears to confuse
the meaning of "interest" as used in section 506 of the Code with
"interest" as used by Judge Hand in Murel. Interest paid on a
claim pursuant to section 506 constitutes payment of a
91. Timber 11, 808 F.2d at 373.
92. Timbers 1, 793 F.2d at 1381.
93. Id. at 1390.
94. Murel, 75 F.2d at 942.
95. Timbers III, 484 U.S. 365, 382 (1988).
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claim-while "interest" requested by an undersecured creditor as
adequate protection has little to do with payment of its claim. This
second type of payment-nominally called "interest"-is not a
"right to payment" as defined in section 101(4) of the Code-but
rather is compensation for the delays incident to bankruptcy
proceedings.
Adequate protection has its roots in the due-process clause of
the fifth amendment.96 When the present value of a secured credi-
tor's collateral is used to enable a debtor to reorganize, such use of
the present value of the secured creditor's collateral may constitute
a taking without compensation. The Supreme Court previously has
indicated that money a debtor promises to pay in the future nor-
mally is worth less than the money a debtor pays today. 7 Argua-
bly, the loss the secured creditor suffers, therefore, may represent a
"taking" under the fifth amendment.
Valuation issues and ambiguities arise most frequently at two
points in a bankruptcy case: 1) when a secured creditor seeks to
modify the automatic stay pursuant to section 362 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code; and 2) when a secured creditor seeks to challenge the
treatment of a claim under a proposed plan of reorganization.
These ambiguities cause lawyers and clients problems, because to
prevail at trial, the lawyers must provide proof of the appropriate
valuation standards.
III. VALUATION IN ADEQUATE-PROTECTION ACTIONS
After a bankruptcy case starts, the court gives "adequate pro-
tection" to secured parties, or any other party with a cognizable
"interest" in property of the estate who requests such protection .
The bankruptcy court gives such protection by "prohibiting" or
"conditioning" the debtor's use, sale, or lease of the subject prop-
erty during the pendency of a bankruptcy case. The Code, how-
ever, does not require protection of the value of that collateral.
Instead, the Code imposes the concept of "adequate protection"
for the value of a person's interest in the property." Moreover,
unless a court requires the estate to protect the collateral ade-
quately, the estate may use, sell, or lease the property in the ordi-
96. See Wright, supra note 23; Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radord, 295 U.S.
555 (1935) and H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 339 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6295.
97. See supra notes 35 & 68.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1988) addresses adequate protection for parties with an interest in
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nary course of business without notice or a hearing and regardless
of the property's value.100 Cash collateral represents the only ex-
ception to this rule.' Before a secured creditor may use cash col-
lateral, the creditor must obtain the debtor's consent or court
approval."12
When an entity having an interest in property being used,
sold, or leased by the estate requests adequate protection for its
interest, the court must "prohibit" or "condition" such use, sale, or
lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such inter-
est. If the interest holder requests protection under section 363 by
seeking modification of the automatic stay, the court then may re-
quire the estate to provide adequate protection under section
362(d)(1). The court also may require the debtor to demonstrate
equity in the property or the need for the property for an effective
reorganization under section 362(d)(2). If the estate fails to meet
these requirements, then the estate will lose the property to a se-
cured creditor.
10 3
Not surprisingly, these adequate-protection and equity deter-
minations involve a wide variety of value determinations. If no eq-
uity exists in the property, the debtor must show that the property
is necessary to an effective reorganization04-a concept that would
appear similar to utility value. Under such circumstances, then the
creditor may choose to concede that the property has utility value
and focus its efforts instead on whether the estate can provide ade-
quate protection for its interest.0 5
100. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 363(e) (1988).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (1988) (which defines cash collateral as "cash, negotiable
instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents
whenever acquired in the estate and an entity other than the estate has an interest and
includes the proceeds, products, offspring, merits, or profits of property subject to a security
interest").
102. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (1988).
103. Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(g) (1988), the party requesting relief from the automatic
stay has the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in property, and the party
opposing such relief has the burden of proof on all other issues. An interesting situation
arises when the moving party (presumably a secured creditor) presents a case that consists
of proving its debt and the validity of its security interest in the property and proving that
the property is worth less than the present amount of its debt. Assume that the secured
creditor's interest vests and that the debtor presents no evidence. In such an event, it is
unclear whether the movant would have met its "burden of proof" on the issue of lack of
adequate protection. Courts have not yet determined whether the movant must prove as
part of its case in chief that the collateral in question is decreasing in value or whether the
burden of proof and burden of going forward to demonstrate that either the collateral is not
decreasing in value or that any such decrease in value is being protected vests with the
debtor.
104. See infra Part VIII.
105. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988). 16
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One must further examine the adequate-protection section of
the Code to understand the dilemma secured creditors and bank-
ruptcy courts face after the Timbers holdings. Although the Code
provides examples of how an estate may provide adequate protec-
tion,'" only two examples in section 361 require protection for a
decrease in value. First, for example, section 361(1) may require a
trustee "to make a cash payment or periodic cash payments to
such entity, to the extent that the stay under [s]ection 362 ...
results in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such
property. ' 10 7 Second, the trustee may provide an entity with an
additional or replacement lien, pursuant to section 361(2), "to the
extent that such stay, use, sale, lease, or grant results in a decrease
in the value of such entity's interest in such property.
'10 8
In addition to these two explicit examples of adequate protec-
tion, section 361(3) states that the court may provide adequate
protection by "granting such other relief" that will result in the
entity's realizing the "indubitable equivalent" of its interest in the
property.109 The indubitable equivalence language of section 361(3)
was the impetus for the Ninth Circuit's granting adequate protec-
tion to undersecured creditors for lost opportunity costs in Ameri-
can Mariner.110 However, when the Supreme Court addressed in-
dubitable equivalence in Timbers III, it not only failed to reconcile
the three alternatives provided by section 361, but it also failed to
address when or whether compensation to a secured creditor in the
form of an "indubitable equivalent" would be appropriate or when,
if ever, a court may consider the harm a creditor suffers from in-
herent delays and risks of a bankruptcy proceeding."1
106. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1988).
107. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
108. 11 U.S.C. § 361(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
109. 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (1988).
110. See discussion, supra notes 43-49.
111. The Supreme Court attempted to discuss and to justify its reversal of the district
court's interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (1988) by noting that the "indubitable
equivalent" language in 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (1988) also appears in 11 U.S.C. §
1129(B)(2)(A)(iii) (1988). Apparently, the Court took the position that the "indubitable
equivalent" language only entitled a secured creditor to receive the present value of its se-
curity in connection with a plan of reorganization. See discussion of indubitable equivalence
found in Timbers III, 484 U.S. 377-79. The Court further noted that no "merit" existed in
"petitioner's suggestion that 'indubitable equivalent' in [11 U.S.C.] § 361(3) [(Supp. V
1987)] connotes reimbursement for the use value of collateral because the phrase is derived
from In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935) where it bore that meaning." Id.
at 378. The Supreme Court justified its distinction stating that "[in rejecting the plan,
Murel used the words 'indubitable equivalence' with specific reference not to interest (which
was assured), but to the jeopardized principal of the loan." Id. The author finds the Su-
preme Court's attempt to "explain" and "distinguish" the definitions of "indubitable equiv-
alence" as used in Murel and in 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (1988) to be virtually unintelligible.
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A. Adequate Protection After the Timbers Holdings
Secured creditors bemoan the elimination of lost opportunity
costs as a result of the three Timbers decisions. So far, however,
secured creditors have not labeled such elimination a "taking"
under the fifth amendment. Their failure to recognize the elimina-
tion of "lost opportunity costs" as a "taking" may lie in the nature
of the lost opportunities that Timbers has forced secured creditors
to forego. When lenders foreclose in a depressed economy, the vast
majority realize expense-not profit-from their collateral. The
lenders' lost opportunities may include an inability to possess an
asset after buying it at a foreclosure sale and not being able to
transfer the asset to a purchaser on a non-recourse pay-as-you-can
note.
Inevitably, under the current Timbers analysis of disallowing a
secured creditor to recoup lost opportunity costs, a secured credi-
tor may suffer lost opportunity costs of such magnitude that the
creditor could raise a serious due-process challenge. In such an in-
stance, the secured creditor will demand that the Supreme Court
redefine the role of "indubitable equivalence" in adequate-protec-
tion hearings.
B. Valuation After the Timbers Holdings
Although the Timbers holdings eliminated lost opportunity
costs-which raises a potential fifth-amendment "taking" is-
sue-the most disturbing aspect of these holdings is their silence
on critical valuation issues. Such issues pertain not only to the
type and degree of proof required to establish a "decrease in
value" under sections 361(1) and (2) but also to the extent to
which the "indubitable equivalence" provisions of section 361(3)
survive after Timbers III.
Secured creditors may be able to show at least a risk of signifi-
cant decreases in the value of their collateral through a drop in
market prices, straight-line depreciation, deferred maintenance or
other methods, assuming such proof is admissible and relevant evi-
dence after Timbers III.
Secured creditors must demand that bankruptcy courts rede-
fine "indubitable equivalence," so that they can reliably assess the
risks they face in bankruptcy and develop their own procedures to
control their risk of loss. Such redefining may require the help of
expert witnesses such as economists and investment bankers who
Certainly, this explanation leaves much to be desired in the way of guidance for secured
creditors whose loan balances are at risk. 18
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can put more meaning into the term.1 2
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF RISK IN VALUATION AND ADEQUATE
PROTECTION
Bankruptcy courts commonly require a bankruptcy estate to
insure its property against the risk of fire and other hazards. More-
over, courts wrestle with the difficulty in factoring other types of
risk into valuation of collateral and in taking risk into account
when designing adequate protection. Yet, anyone who has wit-
nessed real-estate markets in Texas and the farm belt in the past
five years would note-without humor-that the risk of a market
decline is equal to, if not greater than, the risk of fire, flood, or
other natural catastrophes.
Currently, actual decrease in value is the appropriate valua-
tion standard in adequate-protection hearings when the term is
used in connection with automatic-stay or confirmation hearings.
However, when the risk of decrease in value is the appropriate
"valuation standard" or when such risks are relevant as a compo-
nent of "indubitable equivalence," then perhaps courts also should
require debtors to insure against risk of a decline in value as a part
of adequate protection. However, requesting insurance against
such decline may prove futile if courts interpret Timbers III as a
mandate to ignore risk of any kind when fashioning adequate pro-
tection. Courts also may view creditor risk as a component of lost
opportunity, which Timbers III specifically disallowed.
On the other hand, if risk analysis were considered a legiti-
mate valuation technique, then statisticians may replace appraisers
as the witnesses of choice in adequate-protection hearings. Under
such circumstances, a previous market decline may be relevant to
proving the risk of future decreases in value, while previous market
performance may be irrelevant to the issue of actual future de-
crease in value.
Unfortunately, Timbers I failed to discuss whether a court
may take risk into account when determining whether a secured
creditor is receiving the indubitable equivalence of its claim. How-
ever, the court noted that risk of material harm resulting from con-
tinuation of an automatic stay is one of the four factors mentioned
earlier in determining whether a court may grant or lift a stay.11 s
In a 1985 valuation case, Brite v. Sun Country Development.,
112. See infra Part IX.
113. Timbers I, 793 F.2d at 1391.
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Inc., 4 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was willing to put some
"risk of ownership" on secured creditors when a debtor offered to
exchange property for debt under a plan of reorganization. In Sun
Country, the court cursorily upheld the bankruptcy's court finding
that a lender could tender twenty-one notes, secured by twenty-
one parcels of real property, as the "indubitable equivalence" of
the lender's first lien on a tract of land.
11 5
The Sun Country ruling caused bewilderment and consterna-
tion to creditors and trial judges alike, because it appeared to elim-
inate risk entirely from valuation cases and consequently to permit
dollar-for-dollar exchange of property for debt without any dis-
count for the hazards involved in foreclosing or otherwise realizing
on the property.16 Bankruptcy Judge Wesley Steen opined that
Sun Country merely held "that a creditor who receives promissory
notes with a value equal to his [or her] claim has received the in-
dubitable equivalent of his claim."'" 17 The bankruptcy judge ruled
that a property-for-debt transfer requires "a surplus of value," or,
in other words, "a margin for allowance of error, so that the reali-
zation of equivalence would be indubitable.""'
Reversing the bankruptcy court on appeal, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in In re Sandy Ridge Development Corp.1 9 over-
looked a golden opportunity to discuss the role of risk in valuing
property interests and to alleviate the concerns caused by Sun
Country. Treating "the specific value" of the property "as irrele-
vant,"' 2 ° the Sandy Ridge court held that the debtor could tender
the collateral to the creditor as the indubitable equivalent of its
114. 764 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1985).
115. Id. at 409. Although bankruptcy courts impose a clear-and-convincing standard
of proof on the proponent of a reorganization plan, (In re Agawam Creative Mktg. Assoc.,
Inc., 63 Bankr. 612, 619 (Bankr. Mass. 1986); In re National Awards Mfg., Inc., 35 Bankr.
691, 693 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio (1983)), the Sun Country court found sufficient appraisal evi-
dence concerning the value of the lots securing the notes by recent performance history of
the 21 borrowers. Sun Country, 764 F.2d at 409. And the lender lost, even though his fears
concerning the increased burdens and risks involved with collecting on 21 notes were "un-
supported." Id.
116. In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp., 77 Bankr. 69, 73 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987) rev'd on
appeal, 881 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1989). The bankruptcy judge ruled that a property-for-debt
transfer requires "a surplus of value, [and] a margin for allowance of error, so that the
realization of equivalence would be indubitable." Id. The secured creditor had argued that
the bankruptcy court should abandon the property and let the process of foreclosure set the
value of the creditor's secured claim. Sandy Ridge, 881 F.2d at 1354. The Fifth Circuit
reversed the bankruptcy court on appeal. Id. at 1346.
117. In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp., 77 Bankr. 69, 73 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987), rev'd on
appeal, 881 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1989).
118. Id.
119. 881 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1989).
120. Id. at 1353.
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secured claim,12' reasoning that the collateral was necessarily the
indubitable equivalent of the secured claim.12 2 Ironically, the court
acknowledged that the valuation issue may become important, be-
cause a bankruptcy court may be required to value the secured
creditor's deficiency unsecured claim.'
3
The Sandy Ridge court delegated the task of coming up with a
"give back" value-and hence an unsecured deficiency claim-to a
bankruptcy judge.124 Faced with a creditor's concerns that aban-
donment or foreclosure "is necessary to protect" a creditor's "in-
terests in the face of a declining real estate market,' ' 2 5 the court
mandated that such "market factors must be taken into account
when valuing collateral.' 2 6
Not surprisingly, Sun Country and Sandy Ridge have added
to the confusion concerning appropriate and relevant valuation ev-
idence by intimating that risk may not be relevant to value deter-
mination. In Sun Country,'2 7 the Fifth Circuit avoided a sophisti-,
cated analysis of the risk factor and chose instead to rest its
holding on a finding of fact.'2 8 The Sun Country decision did sug-
gest, however, that the lender should shoulder some of the risks
entailed by delay; nonetheless, the court declined to indicate how
this "shouldering" affected the value of the lender's interest in its
collateral for purposes of determining whether the lender received
its indubitable equivalent.'2 9 The Timbers holdings and Sun Coun-
try decision apparently indicate that courts are willing to place
more of the risk inherent in reorganization proceedings on secured
lenders than they had previously shouldered.' °
121. Id. at 1354.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1353.
124. Id. at 1353-54.
125. Id. at 1354.
126. Id.
127. Sun Country, 764 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1985). The Sun Country court appeared to
place the burden of proof for risk and value issues and the burden of going forward on these
issues on the lender. See id. at 409.
128. Id.
129. In justification of its decision to avoid any ruling on the proper valuation stan-
dard, the Sandy Ridge court relied upon 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988), which states that "value
shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition
or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or
on a plan affecting such creditor's interest," and concluded "lilt seems contemplated that
this determination is to be made by the court." Sandy Ridge, 881 F.2d at 1354 (quoting 11
U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988)).
130. On the other hand, these cases may be construed as merely ignoring valuation
issues and speaking to burdens of proof and standards of review on appeal. Creditors in
other circuits should look for ways to adduce evidence to convince the courts that the risk of
decrease in value has reached such a level as to entitle the creditor to adequate-protection
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Arguably, the depressed status of markets lends credence to
secured creditor's cries that courts should protect them from fur-
ther risks of decreases to collateral. Unfortunately, expert testi-
mony that a given real-estate market has "hit bottom" probably
will fall on jaded ears of bankruptcy judges who have been hearing
similar opinions for the past several years.
V. PROVING VALUE AND DECREASE IN VALUE
Proving "decrease in value" under the adequate-protection
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code 3 ' requires two steps. First, the
moving party must establish a starting point-or the present value
of the property. Second, the moving party must demonstrate the
amount by which the property will decrease in value from its start-
ing point during the period for which adequate protection pay-
ments are required.
To complete the first step of the "decrease in value" test, gen-
erally one must prove a decrease in present value, which may be
measured by a decrease in: 1) fair-market value, 2) "foreclosure
sale" value, or 3) "going-concern" value. The moving party must
establish a "bench mark" of present value. 132 Having established
that bench mark, the moving party then must address which stan-
dards to use to prove the appropriate "decrease in value" of the
secured party's collateral. For example, the secured party may be
able to prove that the debtor, an on-going business, soon will run
out of operating capital and that this fact may result in the
debtor's liquidation. Accordingly, the moving party may wish to
argue that the present "going-concern value" of its collateral will
shortly be converted to a "liquidation value" and that the differ-
ence constitutes a "decrease in value" entitling the secured credi-
tor to adequate protection.'33
In the alternative, a court may hold the moving party to the
same value test for present and future valuation. In other words,
the court may require the secured party to prove that the fair-mar-
payments and should seek an explicit ruling as to the burden of proof that the trial court is
imposing on both parties.
131. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) & (2) (1988).
132. For a discussion of burdens of proof and burdens of going forward with respect to
proving value and decrease in value, see supra Part VI.
133. At least one court has tacitly approved the moving party's introduction of such
evidence. The bankruptcy court in In re Beker Indus. Corp., 58 Bankr. 725 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986) acknowledged that different valuation standards may apply to adequate pro-
tection and indicated willingness to consider proof of a sufficient value under an appropriate
valuation standard. The court acknowledged that those asserting a different theory may
cross-examine and impeach the testimony, thereby showing a different value.
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ket, liquidation, or ongoing-concern values of collateral are de-
creasing rather than attempting to prove that the collateral is de-
creasing because the debtor's business is changing from going-
concern to liquidation.
Establishing the appropriate bench mark or starting point for
fair-market, going-concern, or liquidation values is no easy task.
For example, in Citibank, N.A. v. Baer,13 4 the Tenth Circuit at-
tempted to determine the "going-concern" value of a company
whose value consisted of significant, non-producing Canadian Arc-
tic oil and gas interests. Pointing out that any attempt to appraise
these interests would constitute little more than a guess, the Ci-
tibank court quoted the trial court, which stated:
[To] say that you can forecast-that you can appraise the values
in the Canadian Arctic is to say that you can attend the County
Fair with your crystal ball, because that is absolutely the only
possible way you can come up with a result. And I question that
any result that I come up with in the Canadian Arctic is but little
more than what I hope is an informed guess." 5
Every bit as frozen as the Canadian Arctic, real-estate markets
in many states are notably lacking in current comparable sales
from which real-estate brokers can determine real-estate values. In
the absence of comparable sales, appraisers often use the "income
approach" in calculating a value for income-producing property.
This approach involves capitalizing the net income that a property
generates. To value real estate by this approach, one must deter-
mine an appropriate capitalization rate, a loan-to-value ratio, and,
ideally, a cross-verification through actual sales." 6 Slow markets
with the resulting lack of comparable market sales make each of
these processes difficult. Some experts criticize using income capi-
talization as a method for determining value. They argue that the
approach is inconclusive of true market value unless the income
from the property is derived from the intrinsic nature or the "high-
est and best" use of the property itself.'37 These experts recognize
that the highest and best use of property under some circum-
stances may not be as income-producing property, and that in such
a case the income approach may not be truly indicative of value."3 8
134. 651 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1980).
135. Id. at 1347.
136. The anticipated future stream from a property, such as an apartment project, is
subjected to various algebraic formulas, which are supposed to reveal the value of the prop-
erty to a potential purchaser.
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The problem of determining whether a property will be capa-
ble of generating income in the future is even more difficult in rad-
ically depressed economies. In such economies the highest and best
use of real property may be changing. When cities are tearing
down apartment projects and replacing them with parks and park-
ing lots, appraisers and other experts who value a ten-year old,
half-vacant apartment by an income-capitalization method are
making a questionable assumption about the future of the econ-
omy at best and a leap of faith at worst. The future income pro-
duced by these properties may be zero. Yet such assumptions are
rarely even expressed, and even more rarely questioned when de-
termining what constitutes adequate protection or what basis ex-
ists for modifying an automatic stay.
VI. EVIDENCE OF DECREASE IN VALUE
A wide variety of evidence may be selected to support or con-
test valuation determinations. The following outlines some of those
different types of evidence and then discusses why courts should
provide guidance as to their use.
A. Previous Decline in Market Value
The market value of assets-such as oil and gas reserves and
improved and unimproved real estate-has declined drastically in
many states during the past five years. Previous decline, however,
may not automatically translate into future decline. Real-estate
appraisers are qualified to give expert testimony regarding the pre-
sent value of real property although they may not be qualified as
experts to predict future decline in the market or even as to the
risk of future decline.1
39
Predicting future decreases or increases in value for an ade-
quate-protection hearing, the purpose of which is to provide short-
term protection for secured creditors prior to the conclusion of the
bankruptcy case, may prove difficult, if not impossible. First, such
short-term protection is difficult to relate to the market. Second,
one may not be able to ascertain market-value indicators until sev-
139. In both Sun Country and Sandy Ridge, appraisal testimony was used by the
debtor and upheld by the Fifth Circuit on appeal. Although both Sun Country and Sandy
Ridge involved issues relating to future values of the property (in Sun Country, the value of
the 21 lots at some future time when the 21 noteholders might default; in Sandy Ridge, the
value of the property at such time as the creditor might look to the property to satisfy its
claim), the court took no notice of this fact when reviewing and examining the appraisal
evidence. Nor were issues relating to the qualifications of the appraisers to testify as to
these future values raised on appeal by the creditors.
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eral months after they occur. Third, in a depressed econ-
omy-having few, if any, sales-such information is absent. Under
such circumstances, perhaps courts will admit testimony regarding
risk of future declines in value in proving the need for adequate
protection.14
B. Depreciation
Courts may construe depreciation1 4 1 as a form of decline in
market value. Indeed, appraisers traditionally take into account
depreciation when valuing an asset.1 42 An appraiser can calculate
an annual and a monthly depreciation figure that approximates the
actual deterioration of the collateral. Straight-line depreciation
may be adjusted by taking substantial deferred maintenance into
account. Such deferred maintenance will cause improvements to
depreciate at a more rapid rate, which also can be estimated. The
elements of depreciation, which are subject to variance in calcula-
tion and standard in type, include physical, curable, physical de-
ferred, physical incurable, and economic obsolescence.14 3 Moreover,
even the National Commercial Finance Conference stated that the
Bankruptcy Code should provide for "[p]eriodic payments to the
secured creditor . . .of amounts sufficient to cover deterioration,
consumption, depletion or depreciation resulting from use.' 1 44
140. The Timbers I court suggested that a replacement lien, rather than cash pay-
ment, may be the appropriate method of adequate protection for this type of "uneven"
decrease in value. Timbers I, 793 F.2d at 1388.
141. Depreciation is defined as:
A loss of utility and hence value from any cause. An effect caused by deterioration
and/or obsolescence. Deterioration or physical depreciation is evidenced by wear
and tear, decay, dry rot, cracks, encrustations, or structural defects. Obsolescence
is divided into two parts, functional and economic. Functional obsolescence may
be due to poor plans, mechanical inadequacy or over-adequacy, functional inade-
quacy or over-adequacy due to size, style, age, etc. It is evidenced by conditions
within the property. Economic obsolescence is caused by changes external to the
property, such as neighborhood infiltrations of inharmonious groups to the prop-
erty uses, legislation, etc. It is also the actual decline in market value of the im-
provement to land from time of purchase to time of resale.
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, SOCIETY OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, REAL
ESTATE APPRAISAL TERMINOLOGY, 75 (Rev. ed. 1981).
142. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO THE APPRAISAL OF DEPRECIABLE
PROPERTY, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF APPRAISERS, APPRAISAL AND VALUATION MANUAL, VOL. 3
(1958).
143. Manuals also show how to depreciate improvements. Because experts use and
reasonably rely on these manuals, they are admissible in court. FED. R. EVID. 703.
144. Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on S.235 and S.236 Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975) (statement of National Commercial Finance Conference).
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C. Value Loss Because of Loss of Rental Income
Calculating decreases attributable to loss of rental income is
another means of determining decreases in value. The rental-in-
come-loss approach involves constructing a "stabilized" income
model and then deducting various factors, such as mismanage-
ment, leasing commissions, and absorption period from that model
value.
Furthermore, in Timbers I, the Fifth Circuit recognized that




The Bankruptcy Code permits the estate to continue to pay
post-petition rent after filing when debtors lease non-residential
real property. 4" Rental value generally is recognized as an indica-
tion of both projected depreciation of the leased property and a
return on the lessor's investment.14 7 The adequate-protection pro-
vision of Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code 48 states that secured
creditors may obtain rental payments.'"
The concept of rental value as adequate protection is espe-
cially important when the secured creditor's collateral is unim-
proved real estate. Because no improvements exist to depreciate,
and because decline in market value may be difficult to prove in a
slow economy, the secured creditor with a lien on unimproved or
non-income-producing real estate may be unable to prove any
other decrease in value for purposes of adequate protection. Con-
gress evidenced no intent to exclude adequate-protection payments
145. Criticizing Briggs, the Fifth Circuit noted:
Briggs is far narrower than American Mariner. Briggs would require post-petition
"interest" payments depending on the facts of the case, including the length of
the stay, the "quality of the collateral," whether the "collateral's lien value is
demonstrated to be appreciating, depreciating or remaining relatively stable," and
"whether taxes and other payments designed to keep the collateral free of statu-
tory liens are being paid or will be paid by the debtor." (citation omitted). Of
these factors, only the first, length of the stay, has anything whatever to do with
accruing interest or "opportunity costs." There can be no doubt that the other
factors mentioned should be taken into account by any court making a § 362(d)(1)
adequate protection determination.
Timbers I, 793 F.2d at 1416.
146. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(d)(3), 503(b) (1988).
147. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 365.03.
148. 11 U.S.C. § 1205 (1988).
149. For example, the Code states that a debtor must pay the secured creditor "for the
use of farmland the reasonable rent customary in the community where the property is
located, based upon the rental value, net income, and earning capacity of the property." 11
U.S.C. § 1205(b)(3) (1988).
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for secured creditors with liens on unimproved land. Furthermore,
failing to allow adequate-protection payments to secured creditors
for unimproved real estate while mandating administrative-rent
payments to lessors for the same type of property seems
anomalous.
VII. EFFECT OF RES JUDICATA ADEQUATE-PROTECTION FINDINGS
A bankruptcy court's valuation process during an adequate-
protection hearing has little, if any, res judicata effect on subse-
quent value determinations in a bankruptcy case. 150 Emphasizing
the limited res judicata effect of a value determination, the legisla-
tive history of the Code states: "[A] valuation early in the case in a
proceeding under sections 361 to 363 would not be binding upon
the debtor or creditor at the time of confirmation of the plan."
'151
Adequate-protection determinations are not binding on confirma-
tion in a Chapter 11 case.
Presumably, the debtor who survives automatic-stay/ade-
quate-protection hearings-by showing that a secured creditor has
adequate protection because of the present value of the collat-
eral-may take a contrary position when valuing a secured credi-
tor's claim in order to cram down a plan of reorganization under
section 1129(b). The super-priority claim afforded the secured
creditor'52 presents the estate's only legal risk in taking these con-
trary positions.
VIII. VALUATION IN CONNECTION WITH PLANS OF REORGANIZATION
Valuation of collateral may be as unnecessary for confirmation
of a plan under 11 U.S.C. section 1129 as it is for the debtor to
conduct its ordinary business under section 363. Valuation is rele-
vant only if impaired creditors or classes of creditors reject the
plan. This is not to say that valuation does not play a key role in
determining the strategy and tactics debtors and creditors employ
that lead to the proposal, negotiation, and confirmation of a Chap-
ter 11 plan of reorganization. The valuation process outlined in
section 506 determines the dollar amount of the secured claim,
150. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 398 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5854), rev'd on other
grounds, Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988). See also 11 U.S.C. §
506(a) (1988).
151. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5854 (discussing the current provisions codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 361 to
-363 (1988)).
152. 11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1988).
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which the plan treats. The value of a secured creditor's collateral
determines the amount of its secured claim, which the plan propo-
nent must either treat as unimpaired pursuant to section 1124 or
treat in accordance with section 1129(b)(2)(A) if the creditor in-
sists. The value of any unsecured deficiency claim also is impor-
tant, because the holder of the deficiency claim who rejects the
plan may succeed or fail to block approval of the plan depending
on the size of the deficiency.
153
If the unsecured deficiency claim resulting from the valuation
is large in relation to other unsecured claims, the secured-claim
holder may be able to use its unsecured "deficiency" claim to block
acceptance of the plan by the required class of unsecured creditors
and possibly prevent confirmation of the plan entirely.154 The
court deems a class to have accepted a plan only if members of the
class holding at least two-thirds of the total dollar amount and
one-half of the total number of allowed claims in such class vote to
accept the plan. 5 ' If a deficiency claim represents more than one-
third of the dollar amount of all unsecured claims in a class, the
lender holding such a deficiency claim unilaterally can block ac-
ceptance of the plan by the class of unsecured claims that includes
the deficiency. Moreover, because the Code requires at least one
impaired class of claims to accept the plan,"' the effect of blocking
acceptance by a class of unsecured creditors could be to block con-
firmation of the plan entirely if the class of unsecured creditors is
the only impaired class involved in the proceeding. 157 Hence, a low
valuation of the secured creditor's collateral can represent a strate-
gic benefit to the creditor who is intent on preventing confirmation
of a disadvantageous plan. Valuation also is important in deter-
mining the treatment of secured claims. The Code sets out three
treatments a debtor may use to render a plan "fair and equitable"
to a dissenting class of impaired secured claims." 8
The first treatment outlined in the Code has two elements: a)
The holder of a claim in an impaired secured class must retain all
liens securing such claims regardless of whether the debtor retains
153. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1988). For an example of the value of a secured credi-
tor's unsecured deficiency claim, see In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 400-01, in which a secured
creditor was able to use its unsecured claim to prevent a farmer from keeping his farm in a
Chapter 11 case.
154. See Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 400-01.
155. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1988).
156. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1988).
157. In Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 393, the bankruptcy court was able to determine at an
early stage in the bankruptcy (upon the bank's motion for relief from stay) that confirma-
tion of a plan over the rejection of the deficiency claim would be impossible.
158. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (1988).
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or transfers the collateral property to another entity. b) The holder
of the claim must receive "deferred cash payments totaling at least
the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective
date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest in
the estate's interest in such property. 1
59
The second treatment outlined in the Code in section
1129(b)(2)(A) provides that the collateral securing the claim may
be sold free and clear of all liens, and the liens securing the se-
cured claim must be transferred to the proceeds of the sale."' Ob-
viously, in this context the issue of valuation will rarely arise, be-
cause the sales price of the property is prima-facie evidence of its
value.
The third treatment outlined in the Code requires that the
holder of a claim receive "the indubitable equivalent of such
claims."1 '' The Code provides that a plan of reorganization may
provide for indubitable equivalence so that the holder of a claim in
an impaired and secured class is treated fairly and equitably.
Moreover, ever since the Code's enactment, the phrase "indubita-
ble equivalence," derived from Murel,6 2 has been the subject of
much legal discourse.
Extensive dicta in both Timbers I and Timbers II is devoted
to distinguishing valuation for adequate-protection purposes from
valuation in a plan-confirmation context. Clearly, the prohibition
enunciated in Timbers I and II concerning payment of lost oppor-
tunity costs does not apply to payments proposed under a plan of
reorganization. 6 3 Indeed, many of the cases denying confirmation
of a plan focus on the unfairness of long delays in payments to
secured creditors.
1 6 4
However, the Sandy Ridge and Sun Country decisions 65
demonstrate that valuations for confirmation of a plan over the ob-
jection of a secured creditor (the so-called "cram down") under
section 1129(b) suffer from the same problems as valuations in the
context of adequate protection and include the uncertainty of the
159. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (1988).
160. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1988).
161. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (1988).
162. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d
Cir. 1935).
163. See Timbers 1, 793 F.2d at 1402.
164. In re Georgetown Apartments, 468 F. Supp. 844 (D. Ct. M.D. Fla. 1979) (five-
year moratorium on payments to secured creditor does not provide adequate protection); In
re Stoffel, 41 Bankr. 390 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (debtor's plan not fair and equitable when
plan would defer payment of debt for four and one-half years while debtor continued to use
land).
165. See discussion of Sandy Ridge and Sun Country, supra Part IV.
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market, the lack of comparables, and the inability of designing val-
uation methods that provide for the contingencies of an uncertain
future. Although courts may be more careful in making value deci-
sions in the context of reorganization plans than in the interim ad-
equate-protection phase, courts may use only the valuation meth-
ods available.
IX. RELEVANCE AND ADMISSIBILITY
A. Expert Testimony in General
Both attorneys and expert witnesses must understand bank-
ruptcy concepts and the expectations of bankruptcy courts when
preparing testimony on value and decrease in value. Too often, the
expert witness misunderstands what is expected in a bankruptcy
hearing and offers expert opinion only on fair-market value as of a
given date. A typical appraiser will be taken by surprise if asked
whether the property in question is presently decreasing in value
or will decrease in value in the future, because this question is not
within the scope of a typical appraisal.
Indeed, testimony concerning future value and decrease in
value may be beyond the expertise of appraisers or other expert
witnesses. Therefore, the attorney should discuss with the expert
whether he or she feels qualified to offer expert testimony concern-
ing a future value or whether such testimony would merely be per-
sonal opinion outside the scope of his or her expertise.
Hearings in bankruptcy courts are governed by the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant
evidence as: "evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the ac-
tion more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."16 Unsubstantiated opinions of future value, whether of
the expert, the debtor, or the lender may not fall within the broad
scope of Rule 401.
Rule of Evidence 701 deals with opinion testimony by lay wit-
nesses and provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testi-
mony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the per-
ception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of
the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.'6 7
166. FED. R. EvID. 401.
167. FED. R. EvID. 701.
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Although courts permit lay witnesses to testify as to the present
value of property under Rule of Evidence 701,168 the courts may
not permit lay testimony as to future values or as to future de-
crease or increase in value.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides for testimony by ex-
perts. The rule provides: "If scientific, technical, or other special-
ized knowledge will assist the trier-of-fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." ' The
party calling an expert must show that the expert possesses scien-
tific, technical, or other specialized knowledge .with regard to the
opinion offered. Overall, the court must determine whether expert
testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue. 170 The court also should determine
whether the subject matter of the expert's testimony is based on "a
reliable body of scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge. 1 7' Bankruptcy courts should carefully scrutinize the opinion
testimony of both lay and expert witnesses concerning future de-
crease in value prior to trial to determine whether the testimony
meets the standards required by the Federal Rules of Evidence.
B. The Court-Appointed Expert
Bankruptcy courts themselves could begin to take the initia-
tive to protect debtors and creditors alike by using the Federal
Rules of Evidence to appoint an expert to give a neutral opinion
regarding the standards and measures of decrease in value. In ad-
dition, using experts in this manner also further distances a bank-
ruptcy judge from the two-hatted role of being bargain-maker as
well as judge.172 Moreover, it would avoid the extreme differences
in value that occur in a typical hearing.
C. Appraisers as Expert Witnesses
Appraisers have become expert witnesses in bankruptcy cases
almost by historical accident. Bankruptcy lawyers who frequently
168. See, e.g., In re Damron, 8 Bankr. 323, 325 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
169. FED. R. EvID. 702.
170. See Ellis v. K-Lan Co., 695 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1983).
171. RUSSELL, BANKRUPTCY EVIDENCE MANUAL, § 702.3 (1987).
172. The Federal Rules of Evidence allow a court to make "its own motion," and to
"enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed," and a court
"may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection." FED. R. EVID. 706. All of the Federal
Rules of Evidence "apply in cases [arising] under the [Bankruptcy] Code." BANKR. R. 9017.
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develop their acquaintance with bankruptcy law through general-
litigation practice are familiar with using appraisers in valuation
hearings. The types of valuation hearings that arise in a non-bank-
ruptcy context generally are vastly different from the types of val-
uation hearings that a bankruptcy court conducts. For example,
non-bankruptcy litigation typically focuses on the present or past
value of property. Valuation hearings in bankruptcy cases, on the
other hand, frequently focus on the future value of property.
Bankruptcy courts expect expert witnesses -to assist them in deter-
mining a future decrease in value of property..
Lawyers frequently make the following common errors when
hiring an appraiser as an expert witness. First, lawyers may fail to
inform the appraiser of the type of evidence and the most effective
method of presentation of evidence in a bankruptcy court. Instead,
the lawyer will simply contact the appraiser and request an ap-
praisal. Typically, this results in an appraisal of the fair-market
value of the property in question as of a certain date. Second, law-
yers may not inform their appraisers that the appraisers are ex-
pected to testify concerning future value and future decrease in
value until the appraisers are sitting on the witness stand in an
adequate-protection hearing.
A lawyer's failure to inform expert witnesses and, in turn, the
breakdown of communication between expert witnesses and the
trial court often results in a poor record on appeal. The Timbers I
court appeared to endorse the present state of the art of appraisal
testimony when it remanded the case to the district court for fur-
ther proceedings rather than suggesting appropriate testimony to
determine the decrease in value, if any, of the secured creditor's
claim. 1 3 Ironically, testimony by other "experts," such as econo-
mists, accountants, investment bankers, or brokers, may have been
more relevant to the Timbers issues than was the appraisal
testimony. 174
X. CONCLUSION
Neither lawyers nor judges can perform the difficult valuation
task which the Code has imposed upon them in a legal vacuum.
Valuation issues are emerging from the complexities of bankruptcy
cases that demand legal standards against which to measure the
facts admitted into evidence. Valuation issues, even findings of fact
which form the basis for a value ruling, are predicated upon legal
173. See Timbers I, 793 F.2d at 1416.
174. See Timbers H, 808 F.2d 363.
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standards of relevance and admissability that lie within the powers
of appellate courts to correct.175
This paper has briefly traced the emergence of some of the
more significant valuation issues from their "origins" in Wright
and Murel to their current influence on contemporary bankruptcy
issues, although their influence impliedly has waned in the advent
of the Timbers holdings.
In tracing the evolution of bankruptcy law, one must note that
Wright and Murel involved two radically different situations. For
example, in Wright an appellate court approved a short-term delay
in a lender's right to obtain a foreclosure so as to permit a debtor
to come up with the cash needed to redeem its property. In Murel,
on the other hand, an appellate court declined to stay a foreclosure
in view of the debtor's proposed "plan" to stretch out the secured
creditor's loan over ten years. Although the facts of these decisions
differ radically, courts, and especially the Fifth Circuit, have used
Timbers I and Timbers II almost interchangeably as bearing on
the issue of adequate protection. In other words, courts have inter-
preted these decisions to mean that adequate protection does not
entitle an undersecured creditor to compensation for the delay be-
tween when a debtor files bankruptcy and when a court confirms a
plan of reorganization.
The result of these rulings has been that lenders that now fail
to receive compensation, during what can be lengthy periods of de-
lay before a court approves the debtor's plan of reorganization, are
closing their doors. To prevent more banks from going out of busi-
ness and to aid lenders in their plight, the Timbers holdings should
have outlined a means of determining value when a secured credi-
tor raises the issue of indubitable equivalence17 ' in substitution for
the now-overruled measure of lost opportunity costs. In the alter-
native, these holdings should have formulated a solution that bal-
anced the considerations outlined in Wright and Murel and pro-
vided some measure for determining when a delay in enforcement
of a creditor's rights triggers the need for "valuing" the interest of
the creditor whose rights are being delayed. Instead, the Timbers
holdings place the burden of determining such standards on al-
ready overburdened bankruptcy judges, which will result in dispa-
rate, rather than uniform treatment. 7
175. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 398 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union of United
States, Inc. 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984)).
176. 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (1988).
177. Timbers II stated that bankruptcy judges need to exercise "early and on-going
judicial management of Chapter 11 cases." 808 F.2d at 373. Such statement would appear to
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The Supreme Court's failure to articulate any rule or standard
in Timbers III means practitioners must now find appropriate val-
uation evidence in a legal vacuum, as noted. Such evidence is com-
plex and frequently involves several different value concepts, mak-
ing reversal of a case on appeal more likely. No doubt appellate
courts are mindful of Congress's express intent to fashion section
361 of the Code in generalities to permit flexible application on a
case-by-case basis. However, a great difference exists between pre-
serving the flexibility of the concept of adequate protection on the
one hand and in preserving the current ambiguous state of the law
governing application of valuation standards on the other.
Issues emerging from the complex task of defining standards
of valuation, adequate protection, and indubitable equivalence
continue to plague practitioners, expert witness and bankruptcy
judges alike. Until governing rules of law emerge, bankruptcy prac-
titioners should take care to enunciate clearly at trial, for purposes
of preserving on appeal, the valuation standards, burden of proof,
and rules of evidence, which they believe govern the matters to be
heard by bankruptcy judges in their petitions.
The unwillingness of appellate courts to establish rules of law
governing bankruptcy valuation has been disappointing. During
the years since Timbers I, the Fifth Circuit has been plagued with
the failure of countless financial institutions. The fate of many of
these institutions may have been tied to their inability to realize
significant value from collateral that was tied up in bankruptcy
proceedings. For these institutions and for the public in general
concepts such as "indubitable equivalence" and "adequate protec-
tion" have taken on a certain poignancy in hindsight. Bankruptcy
courts have afforded lenders "protection" that fails to ensure the
lenders' own survival, and the result has been the closing of many
contradict the legislative history behind 11 U.S.C. §§ 361 to -363. When enacting 11 U.S.C. §
361, Congress evinced a clear intention to remove the Bankruptcy Court from the role of
administrator:
This section specifies the means by which adequate protection may be provided.
It does not require the court to provide it. To do so would place the court in an
administrative role. Instead, the trustee or debtor in possession will provide or
propose a protection method. If the party that is affected by the proposed action
objects, the court will determine whether the protection provided is adequate. The
purpose of this section is to illustrate means by which it may be provided and to
define the contours of the concept.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 338 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6295 (emphasis added).
The legislative history reflects Congress's concern that the concept of adequate protec-
tion remain flexible. This concept of flexibility is important to permit courts to adapt to
varying circumstances and changing modes of financing. Id.
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banks in Texas, for example. The opportunity costs that were lost
may have been the opportunity to keep the banks' doors open for
depositors.
Perhaps only the collapse of so many lending institutions into
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Resolution
Trust Corporation18 prevented a major fifth amendment challenge
to the current application of adequate protection to undersecured
creditors. However, as discussed above, the possibility of a "tak-
ing" issue hides behind the ambiguities plaguing bankruptcy valu-
ations. Appellate courts should exercise every opportunity to clar-
ify bankruptcy valuation issues so as to avoid such problems.
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